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Existing research on the relationship between market concentration and innovation has produced 
conflicting findings. In addition, the emerging literature on the relationship between corporate 
governance and innovation tends to focus only on partial effects of corporate governance on 
innovation. We aim to contribute to the debate by investigating both partial and combined effects of 
corporate governance and market concentration on innovation. Utilising a dataset for 1,400 non-
financial US-listed companies and two-way cluster-robust estimation methodology, we report 
several findings. First, the relationship between market concentration and innovation is non-linear. 
Secondly, the relationship has a U-shape in the case of input measure of innovation (research and 
development - R&D – expenditures); but it has an inverted-U shape when net book-value of brands 
and patents is used as output measure of innovation. Third, corporate governance indicators such as 
anti-takeover defences and insider control tend to have a negative partial effect on R&D 
expenditures but a positive partial effect on net book-value of brands and patents. Finally, when 
interacted with market concentration, anti-takeover defences and insider control act as complements 
to market concentration. Hence, firms with strong anti-take-over defences and under insider control 
tend to spend more on R&D but are less able to generate valuable brands and patents as market 
concentration increases. These results are based on two-way cluster-robust estimation, which takes 
account of both serial and cross-sectional dependence in the error terms.  
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 1. Introduction 
The debate on the relationship between market structure and innovation dates back to Schumpeter 
(1934, 1942), who posited that firms’ innovation effort is likely to be higher when markets are 
concentrated and/or firm size is large. The Schumpeterian hypothesis is based on the assumption 
that market power enables firms to generate excess profits, which can be used to hire highly 
qualified personnel and respond to competition quickly by utilising internal finance instead of 
relying on costly external finance. In addition, market concentration and large size enable firms to 
enjoy the benefits of innovation by erecting new barriers against future entry.  
Nevertheless, the theoretical and empirical work that follows does not provide unequivocal support 
to the Schumpeterian hypothesis.  In a recent survey, Gilbert (2006) indicates that the jury is still 
out and that the Schumpeterian hypothesis may not hold because of the way in which monopoly 
power affects manager attitudes. As Hicks (1935) had observed, monopolies may be slow to 
innovate because monopoly power enables managers to enjoy “quite life”. When such agency 
problems are taken into account, corporate governance quality emerges as an additional determinant 
of innovation effort. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate not only the partial effects of corporate 
governance and market concentration on innovation, but also their combined effects. The combined 
effects have been investigated only by Aghion et al (1999 and 2002), who demonstrate that 
corporate governance may be either a substitute for or a complement to competition – depending on 
whether managers are profit-maximizers or satisficers.   
 
However, despite Agion et al’s (1999, 2002) contribution and the significant increase in the volume 
of work that examines the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 
general, the number of studies that investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
innovation has remained limited. In addition, existing studies tend to focus on the relationship 
between innovation and corporate governance only and as such they overlook the combined effects 
of corporate governance and market structure on innovation incentives and outcomes.  
 
The aim of this article is to contribute to the existing literature by analysing the relationship 
between corporate governance, market concentration and input and output measures of firm-level 
innovation. We demonstrate that both corporate governance and market concentration are related to 
R&D expenditures and net book-value of patents and brands in a sample of US-listed non-financial 
firms. The theoretical explanation for the relationship can be summarised as follows: given a firm’s 
corporate governance regime, the level of market concentration affects the managers’ R&D effort 
because it determines the level of expected profits before and after innovation. However, 
investment in innovation is costly and associated with uncertain returns for shareholders and 
uncertain private benefits for managers. Hence corporate governance rules, which reflect the time 
horizon of the shareholders and the extent to which managers are profit-maximizers or satisificers, 
emerge as additional factors that determine the firm’s R&D effort at each level of market 
concentration. The aim of this article is to investigate how market concentration and corporate 
governance characteristics affect R&D effort separately and in interaction with each other.  
 
The data for this investigation consists of an unbalanced panel for 1,400 US-listed firms over the 
period 2004-2010. Given that the data generating process consists of repeated observations on the 
same set of firms over time, panel data tend to contain variables that are both cross-sectionally and 
serially correlated. Therefore, the common assumption of independence in regression errors may 
not be valid. In this paper, we address the issue of cross-sectional and serial dependence by using a 
relatively new method that is robust to both forms of dependence. This two-way cluster-robust 
method reduces the risk of biased estimates by producing well-specified test statistics (see for 
example Gow et al, 2007: Thompson, 2006).   
 
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and explains the method of estimation. Section 4 reports the 
empirical findings, whilst the last section summarizes the main findings and distils some policy- 
and practice-relevant conclusions. 
 
2. Related literature 
Firm’s innovation effort must be analysed by taking into account two factors that affect the 
incentives of firm managers: the extent of product-market competition they face and the nature of 
the corporate governance rules they are bound with.  Yet, so far and with the exception of Aghion et 
al (1999 and 2002), the relationship between these factors and innovation has been analysed 
separately. As a result, we observe a detachment between a well-developed body of work on the 
relationship between market structure and innovation and an emerging literature on the relationship 
between corporate governance and innovation. In order to set the stage for joint analysis, we will 
first summarise the main findings of the theoretical work on the competition-innovation 
relationship. This will be followed by a similar exercise on the relationship between corporate 
governance and innovation. At the end of this section, we will draw on Aghion et al (1999 and 
2002) to develop the case for joint analysis, whereby research and development (R&D) 
expenditures are estimated by controlling for market concentration, corporate governance indicators 
and the interaction between the two.  
 
2.1 Market concentration and innovation 
 
The determinants of innovation have been a subject of intense debate since Schumpeter (1934, 
1942) advanced the argument that ‘large firms and concentrated market structures promote 
innovation’ (Gilbert, 2006: 159). Arrow (1962) is the earliest attempt that takes issue with the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis. Arrow work demonstrates that a monopoly shielded against competition 
has less incentive to innovate because it can earn positive profits with or without innovation. 
However, a firm in a perfectly competitive market does not earn positive unless it innovates and its 
innovation is protected by exclusive intellectual property rights. Given that the incentive for 
innovation depends on the sum of pre- and post-innovation profits, a competitive firm tends to have 
greater incentives to innovate compared to a monopolist.  
However, Arrow (1962) examines the case of a pure monopolist and a perfectly-competitive firm. 
Gilbert and Newey (1982) derives opposite conclusions – i.e., find support for the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis - by analysing the case of imperfect competition. They examine the case of a monopolist 
with existing technology and a new-comer investing in new technology. In their analysis, 
innovation is a ‘bid for patents’ and the successful bidder (i.e., the innovator) earns higher post-
innovation profits. In this scenario, there is support for Schumpeter’s hypothesis because the 
incumbent monopolist will always earn higher levels of total profits over the pre- and post-
innovation periods.  A monopolist will earn monopoly profits before innovation + duopoly profits 
after innovation if its bid for patent is unsuccessful (i.e., if the new-comer is successful in the bid for 
patent). The same monopolist will earn monopoly profits in both periods if its own bid for patent is 
successful. Compared to the incumbent monopolist, the new-comer face zero profits/rents if its bid 
for patent is unsuccessful and can earn only duopoly profits if it is successful. Therefore, the 
incumbent firm with significant market power can be expected to invest more in innovation 
compared to a new-comer. 
 
The neat result obtained by Gilbert and Newey (1982) depends on the assumption that the patent is 
obtained by the highest bidder – i.e., by the firms that invests more in R&D. This assumption is 
challenged by Reinganum (1983, 1985) who demonstrate that the end result of the innovation 
process is uncertain – i.e., innovation expenditures increase the probability of obtaining the patent 
but does not guarantee success. Given this uncertainty, the incumbent monopolist will decide to 
invest in innovation depending on the nature of innovation (drastic versus incremental innovation) 
and on the probability of innovation by the new-comer. Reinganum (1983, 1985) show that, the 
expected profits for the monopolist that invests in drastic innovation are less than the expected 
profits for a competitor; and this result holds even if innovation becomes less drastic on a 
drastic/non-drastic scale.  
 
The large volume of the empirical literature reviewed by Gilbert (2006) yields similar conflicting 
results. It is evident that the debate has been dominated by antagonism between a positive 
‘Schumpeter effect’ and a negative ‘Arrow effect’ from market concentration on to innovation. As 
Peneder (2012) observes, however, it is simplistic to assume that the effects postulated either by 
Schumpeter or Arrow are linear or independent of the degree of initial competition assumed. In 
Schumpeter, the argument concerning the impossibility of endogenous innovation under perfect 
competition is valid only at low levels of initial market concentration. In Arrow, on the other hand, 
the positive effect of competition on innovation is derived from contrasting a legally protected 
monopoly with a competitive duopoly. This scenario clearly implies high levels of market 
concentration. Therefore the incentives analysed by Schumpeter and Arrow unfold exactly at the 
opposite ends of the market concentration spectrum.  
 
The non-uniformity of the competition-innovation relationship is central to the theoretical and 
empirical work by Philippe Aghion and his co-researchers – even though their earlier work within 
the endogenous growth theory demonstrates that the effect of product-market competition on 
innovation is negative. The work by Aghion and his colleagues deserve special mention here 
because not only do they provide a framework that captures the diverse findings in the empirical 
literature, but also because they address the interaction between competition and corporate 
governance explicitly.  
 
Aghion et al (2002a, 2005) explain the non-linear relationship between product-market competition 
and innovation through a formal model where both incumbent technological leaders and their 
followers can innovate, and all innovations occur step-by-step. This model predicts that competition 
leads to higher levels of innovation when incumbent firms operate with similar technologies – i.e., 
when technological competition is neck-and-neck. In addition, neck-and-neck competition in 
technology is more likely to occur when product-market competition is low. Hence, at low levels of 
product-market competition, innovation is expected to increase as product-market competition 
increases. However, when product-market competition is already high, innovation is more likely to 
be undertaken by new-comers with low-profits. New-comers in competitive markets engage in 
innovation because the latter improves their post-innovation profits. In this case, further increases in 
product-market competition will be associated with lower levels of innovation because the 
innovative firms have low initial profits. The main mechanism that drives the inverted-U 
relationship between competition and innovation is that the fraction of sectors with neck-and-neck 
or new-comer competitors is an endogenous outcome of the equilibrium innovation intensities in 
different sectors. This theoretical perspective implies that the relationship between product-market 
competition and innovation should be modelled and estimated as a non-linear relationship – 
whereby innovation tends to increase with competition at low levels of competition and to decline 
with competition at high levels of competition.  
 
2.2 Corporate governance and innovation 
 
The limitation of Aghion et al (2002a, 2005) is that their results depend on the assumption that 
innovation takes place in a step-by-step manner and the laggard firms (the new-comers) never 
overtake the incumbents. Therefore, the non-linear relationship they predict can be questioned. Yet, 
other work by Aghion and his colleagues point out a different mechanism that can also generate a 
non-linear relationship between product-market competition and innovation. This is the managers’ 
innovation incentives that are determined not only by competition in the product market but also by 
the nature of the corporate governance rules they are bound with.  
 
Aghion et al (1999 and 2002b) examine the ways in which innovation efforts can be affected by the 
interaction between product-market competition and corporate governance – paying attention to 
their disciplining effects on managers. According to Aghion et al (1999) managers face conflicting 
incentives with respect to innovation. On the one hand, they are prone to minimise not only the 
direct cost of innovation but also the adjustment cost associated with implementation of the new 
technology. On the other hand, they are motivated to innovate as a means of reducing the risk of 
bankruptcy. On balance – and irrespective of the kind of corporate governance rules and/or debt 
pressure they face – increased product-market competition leads managers to undertake higher 
levels of innovations. However, if corporate governance rules and/or debt pressure are already strict 
enough to reduce managerial slack and thereby induce innovation, product-market innovation 
becomes less significant as a driver of innovation. In this analysis, corporate governance (or 
financial discipline) AND product-market competition are substitutes rather than complements. 
 
A wider set of theoretical results and empirical findings are reported in Aghion et al (2002b), which 
examines the interplay between corporate governance, product-market competition and financial 
discipline. Aghion et al (2002b) extends the model of Aghion et al (1999) by introducing step-by-
step innovation (already discussed above) and Hart’s (1983) idea of ‘competition as an incentive 
scheme’. This extension enables Aghion et al (2002b) to demonstrate that competition and 
corporate governance as well as competition and financial discipline can be complementary in their 
effects on innovation. This is because step-by-step innovation enables managers to use innovation 
as a route for ‘escaping’ competition when the managers are already faced with strict governance 
rules and high risk of bankruptcy. The theoretical and empirical findings of Aghion et al (2002b) 
confirm the non-linear relationship between competition and innovation reported in Aghion (2002a 
and 2005); and relate the non-linear nature of the relationship to interplay between product-market 
competition, corporate governance and financial discipline. Stated explicitly, corporate governance 
and financial discipline can be either complementary or substitute to product-market competition as 
a driver of innovation.  
 
In this setting, satisficing managers face conflicting incentives with respect to innovation. On the 
one hand, they are motivated to minimise the innovation effort in order to avoid the direct cost of 
innovation and the adjustment cost associated with implementing the new technology. On the other 
hand, they are motivated to innovate in order to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. Given this 
optimisation strategy, how would an increase in product market competition affect the manager’s 
innovation effort? According to Aghion et al (1999), product market competition would tilt the 
balance in favour of higher innovation effort and higher growth. This is because higher levels of 
product market competition lead to lower flow of rents to firms that have just innovated. Therefore, 
these firms must innovate sooner rather than later in order to remain solvent and/or to compete with 
advanced firms for skilled labour requiring higher wages. The result is that product-market 
competition stimulates innovation especially when managers satisfice – i.e., when they do not 
respond to monetary incentives under dispersed ownership structures. In other words, corporate 
governance and product market competition emerge as substitutes when firm managers satisfice 
rather than maximize profits.  
 
This prediction has been challenged by evidence in Grosfeld and Tressel (2001), who utilize a 
panel-data set for 200 firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Market during the period 1990-1998. The 
authors report that higher levels of product market competition increases total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth in firms with both concentrated and dispersed ownership. The positive relationship 
between competition and innovation in firms with concentrated ownership (i.e., in firms where 
managers are expected to be profit-maximizers rather than satisficers) suggests complementarity 
between corporate governance and product market competition.  
 
To address this contradiction, Aghion et al (2002) draw on earlier models where innovation occur 
step-by-step’ – i.e, a laggard firm must first innovate to catch up with the technological leader, 
before it can become a leader in the future. In this setting, the incentive to innovate is equal to the 
difference between the effects of innovation on post-innovation and pre-innovation rents. 
Competition encourages innovation because, as competition increases, the firm’s post-innovation 
rents would fall by less than the fall in pre-innovation rents. In other words, innovation is a means 
of escaping the harmful effects of competition on excess profits. Introducing corporate governance 
into the analysis, Aghion et al (2002) demonstrate that the positive effect of competition on 
innovation will be stronger in firms where corporate governance provides better alignment between 
the interests of managers and shareholders - i.e., under concentrated ownership. This is just the 
opposite of the finding in Aghion et al (1999) and can be stated as follows: product market 
competition stimulates innovation especially when managers act like profit-maximizers – i.e., when 
they do respond to monetary incentives under a concentrated ownership structure. In other words, 
corporate governance and product market competition emerge as complements. 
 
Full-scale investigations of the relationship between corporate governance and innovation are 
relatively recent. Nonetheless, there is an evident increase in the volume of work in this area and the 
theories it draws upon (the principal-agent theory and the theory of contracting) are well established 
in corporate finance. Two recent work (Belloc, 2012; Sapra et al, 2009) provide excellent reviews 
of this emergent literature. In what follows, we will first provide an overview of the theoretical 
findings on the relationship between innovation and corporate governance. Then, we will elaborate 
on why it is necessary to investigate innovation effort not only in the light of market structures or 
corporate governance separately, but by paying attention to the way in which the two dimensions 
interact and affect innovation.  
 
The principal-agent framework tends to affirm that concentrated ownership is conducive to more 
effective monitoring over management strategies and hence reduces the agency costs associated 
with innovation. The argument can be summarised as follows: small and dispersed shareholders are 
less able to monitor managers because monitoring costs may be higher than the benefits (which are 
proportional to their small shareholdings) and this leads to collective action failures generally 
encountered within diffused groups. This view finds support in work by Hill and Snell (1988) and 
Baysinger et al. (1991), who provide theoretical justification and empirical evidence in support of 
the principal-agent framework. Their findings indicate a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and R&D expenditures.  
 
However, this relationship holds only if large shareholders have long time horizons – i.e., if they do 
not prefer to maximise short-term returns at the expense of long-term returns. However, this 
assumption may not hold. This is evident in Hill et al (1988), who argue that one category of large 
shareholders – i.e., institutional investors - are risk-averse and, when they are major shareholders, 
they wield pressure on the management to secure high short-term profits at the expense of long-
term projects such as investment in innovation. Similar findings have been reported by Graves 
(1988), who conclude that institutional shareholders tend to have short-time horizons and that their 
knowledge of the firms or industries in which they operate is limited. Therefore, the higher the level 
of institutional ownership, the lower is the level of innovation investment. 
 
It is clear that the assumption about the time horizon of the large shareholders drives the predictions 
of the principal-agent approach to the relationship between corporate governance and innovation. 
Therefore, the contract theory is called upon to investigate the extent to which ownership structures 
can address the short-time-horizon problem by facilitating contracting between various 
stakeholders. According to Battaggion and Tajoli (2001), ownership structure shapes the ex-post 
bargaining power of the stakeholders and therefore the final allocation of the quasi-rents generated 
by the firm. If the ownership structure facilitates contracting and reduces the asymmetry in the 
distribution of power between small and large shareholders (block-holders), it encourages 
innovation. Otherwise, greater bargaining power enjoyed by the large block-holders reduces their 
commitments to small outside investors and this causes difficulties for the firm in raising funds for 
financing innovative investment projects.  
 
Hence either the principal-agent perspective alone or in combination with contracting theory leads 
to conflicting predictions about the relationship between ownership structures and innovation. 
Similar results are obtained with respect to the relationship between take-over pressure and 
innovation. In Sapra et al (2009), the manager faces a trade-off when they choose the level of 
innovation effort in the face of takeover pressure. On the one hand, investment in innovative 
projects increases take-over pressure as innovation investment is costly and its returns are uncertain. 
On the other hand, higher takeover pressure that may follow investment in innovation results in a 
larger takeover premium to be expected. The manager trades off the benefits of this higher expected 
takeover premium after innovation against the loss of control benefits that may result from 
innovation-induced takeover.  
 
Shleifer and Summers (1988) demonstrate that takeover pressure reduces managers’ willingness to 
invest in firm-specific technological innovation as they anticipate a higher probability of ex-post 
expropriation by ‘raiders’. In other words, higher probability of ex-post takeover leads to 
suboptimal levels of firm-specific investments ex-ante. Maher and Andersson (2002) and Stein 
(1988) also report a negative relationship between takeover pressure and innovation. However, 
these findings are challenged by the ‘quite life’ approach, which argues that anti-takeover defences 
(either through legislation or thorough firm-specific measures such as staggered boards, business 
combination procedures or poison pill provisions) hinder the market for corporate control and 
encourage managerial slack. As managers opt for ‘quite life’, they are less likely to commit to 
investment in costly innovative projects with uncertain outcomes (Jensen, 1988). With a more 
nuanced approach, Sapra et al (2009) demonstrate that the relationship between takeover pressure 
and innovation is non-monotonic: firms are more likely to invest in innovative projects either when 
the market for corporate control is well-developed and takeover pressure is high; or when anti-
takeover laws and provisions are strict enough to deter takeovers.  
 
2.3 Market structure, corporate governance and innovation: towards a synthesis 
The overview presented above indicates that the relationship between market structure, corporate 
governance and innovation can be positive, negative or non-linear – depending on the assumptions 
about the initial level of competition, the incentive structures faced by managers and shareholders, 
and the kind of innovation strategies involved (neck-and-neck versus step-by-step innovation). 
Despite differences in modelling and findings, however, it is possible to detect a degree of 
convergence towards the affirmation of a non-linear relationship between competition and 
innovation. This tendency is confirmed in recent work published in a special issue of the Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade. In an introductory article to the special issue, Peneder (2012) 
states that the nonlinear model is technically sophisticated and has intuitive appeal - not the least 
because it can reconcile the Schumpeterian and Arrow-like arguments. Three empirical papers in 
the special issue test explicitly for non-linear relationship between competition and innovation. 
While Berubé et al (2012) and Polder and Veldhuizen (2012) confirm the existence of an inverted-
U relationship in Canadian and Dutch microdata, Peroni and Gomes Ferreira (2012) report a U-
shaped relationship in Luxembourg firm-level data. 
 
Another conclusion that can be derived from the review above is that both market structure and 
corporate governance rules shape the cost-incentive structure that managers face when they choose 
the level of innovation effort. Therefore, it is necessary to take account of both factors and their 
interaction when we investigate the determinants of innovation. Like the move towards 
investigating the inverted-U relationship between market structure and innovation, the move 
towards joint examination of market structure and corporate governance is informed by Aghion et al 
1999 and 2002).  
 
In this article, we aim to contribute to the existing literature by extending the evidence base on the 
relationship between innovation, market structure and corporate governance. Our contribution 
consists of three components. First, we investigate the relationship between three corporate 
governance indicators and innovation. The corporate governance indicators include board 
independence, anti-takeover defences, and share of insiders in equity. Secondly, we investigate 
whether market concentration and corporate governance are complements or substitutes for the 
three indicators of corporate governance by interacting each indicator with market concentration. 
This exercise enables us to extend the evidence base on compelementarity or substitution between 
corporate governance and competition. The existing evidence on this issue is limited to Aghion 
(1999 and 2002), who investigate the interaction between product market competition and one 
corporate governance dimension – namely ownership structure only. Third, we establish whether 
the results remain robust to inclusion of different firm characteristics such as size and leverage; and 
to use of different clusters consisting of firms and industries. 
 
3. Data and estimations 
We estimate models (3) and (4) below, using an unbalanced panel consisting of 1,400 non-financial 
US-listed companies from the NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX stock exchanges for the period 2004-
2010. The choice of the period is determined by the availability of corporate governance data, 
obtained from the Corporate Library of GovernanceMetrics International. The corporate 
governance data is matched with annual accounting and financial data from Thomson Reuters’ 
Datastream.
1
 Consistent with prior studies, we exclude financial firms (banks, investment trusts, 
insurance companies, and properties companies). To calculate the measure of concentration, we use 
four-digit industry classification code utilized by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
For each company in each year, we have collected data on the following corporate governance 
indicators and financial variables:  
 
Board_Indep: Dummy variable that measures board independence and indicates whether the 
"Outside" directors of a board constitute a majority over "Inside" and "Outside Related" directors. 
The dummy provides information about the extent to which the board can steer the company to 
achieve long-term sustainable growth in shareholder value. Independent boards are expected to 
achieve this objective by discouraging excessive risk-taking for the sake of short-term returns and 
by encouraging long-term investment in areas such as innovation. It takes the value of one if the 
company board is independent, zero otherwise. 
 
                                                 
1
 The Corporate Library has merged with Governance Metrics International in 2010. Information on corporate 
governance metrics provided by GMI can be obtained from http://www3.gmiratings.com/solutions/methodology/ . For 
information on Datastream, see http://online.thomsonreuters.com/datastream/.    
 
Antitakeover_Def: A takeover defence measure that indicates whether the company has both a 
staggered board and business combination provision in the same year. In publicly-held companies, 
staggered boards have the effect of making hostile takeover attempts more difficult. When a board 
is staggered, hostile bidders must win more than one proxy fight at successive shareholder meetings 
in order to exercise control of the target firm. On the other hand, business combination prohibits the 
company from engaging in a merger or other extraordinary transaction with a person or entity that 
owns a specified percentage of the company's stock for some period of time after the shareholder 
acquires the threshold amount. It may also require a higher shareholder vote for approval of 
transactions with the interested or related shareholder, even after the waiting period has expired.   
Both provisions reduce the risk of acquisition and hostile bids.  The dummy variable takes the value 
of one if the company has both staggered board and business combination provision, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
Insider_Control: Insider control indicates whether or not a majority of outstanding shares are held 
by top management and/or directors. It indicates the extent to which shareholder and management 
interests are aligned and takes the value of one if the majority of outstanding shares are held by top 
management and/or directors, zero otherwise. 
 
R&D: Research and development expenditures, defined as all direct and indirect costs related to the 
creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications and products with commercial 
possibilities. This is our ‘input’ measure of innovation.  
 
Assets (A): Total assets of the company, representing the sum of total current assets, long term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets. 
 
R&D/A: The ratio of R&D to total assets – a scaled measure of innovation input. 
 
R&D_Conversion: Ratio of the net book value of patents and brands to research and development 
(R&D) expenditures. This is our ‘output’ measure of innovation, which indicates the extent to 
which firms convert R&D expenditures into valuable patents and brands.  
 
Employees: Natural logarithm of the number of employees as a measure of firm size 
 
Market_cap: Natural logarithm of market capitalisation as an alternative proxy for firm size. 
Market capitalization is equal to the total number of shares outstanding multiplied by the most 
recent quarter-end market price.   
 
Total_Debt_to_Equity: Total (short- and long-term) debt as a multiple of total equity. 
 
Total_Debt_to_Capital: Total (short- and long-term) debt as a multiple of capital 
 
Age: Company age in years. 
 
Net_Sales: The net sales or revenue of the company, defined as gross sales and other operating 
revenue minus discounts, returns and allowances. It excludes items such as non-operating income, 
interest income, rental income, dividend income, etc.  
 
To construct the measure of industry concentration, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) for each industry and year as follows:   
 
      ∑    
            (1)                                                 
Sijt represents the share of firm i in the total sales of industry j for a given year t. The industry is 
defined on the basis of four-digit standard industry classification (SIC) code used by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The HHI ranges between 0 and 1, and indicates higher levels of 
concentration (hence lower levels of competition) as it approaches 1.  
The summary statistics of the variables are in Table 1 below. 
  
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics for pooled sample  
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Ln(R&D) 8138 10.18669 1.842873 0 16.05622 
Ln(R&D /A) 8092 -9.98089 1.476379 -18.522 -2.59429 
Ln(R&D_Conversion) 4045 -1.3136 2.235679 -10.141 6.030546 
Board_Indep 10684 0.898914 0.301456 0 1 
Antitakeover_Def 12185 0.240542 0.42743 0 1 
Insider_Control 12815 0.088178 0.283565 0 1 
HHI 16982 0.327549 0.234844 0 1 
PMC 13395 0.86648 0.069463 0.0506 0.9994 
Total_Debt_to_Equity 15970 187.878 3931.938 0 356937 
Total_Debt_to_Capital 14337 454.9726 21746.5 0 1500000 
Ln(Employees) 16406 7.660588 2.005971 0 14.55745 
Ln(Market_cap) 12762 20.88635 1.697241 -0.6165 26.88236 
Age 11420 38.40657 36.70195 0 234 
 
The empirical work on determinants of firm innovation tends to use panel data sets, which may 
contain variables that are correlated serially and cross-sectionally. These types of correlations 
violate the assumption that the regression residuals are distributed independently. If serial and/or 
cross-sectional dependence exists, the standard OLS estimation leads to underestimated standard 
errors – and therefore higher rates of rejection of the null hypothesis. Empirical studies in finance 
and accounting have tried to address this problem by controlling for one type of dependence at a 
time. For example, Newey and West (1987) propose an estimation method that yields standard 
errors that are robust to time-series dependence. On the other hand, Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
develops a method that produces standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional dependence. 
Although Newey-West and Fama-Macbeth standard errors are less biased downwards, the former 
assumes that the data is cross-sectionally independent while the latter assumes time-series 
independence.  
 
In the last few years, a number of studies in accounting and finance have developed and used a 
method that would allow for two-way clustering and produce standard errors that are robust to two-
way clusters such as time-firm or time-industry clusters. The work by Cameron et al.(2006b); 
Thompson (2006); Petersen (2007); and Gow et al (2010), etc. is based on the observation that most 
of the micro-econometric variables (e.g., R&D expenditures, accounting items, executive salaries, 
corporate governance quality, firm characteristics such as size or leverage, etc.) are likely to be 
correlated both serially and cross-sectionally. If this is the case, controlling for one-type of 
dependence would lead to biased standard errors and inefficient estimates.  
 
To address this shortcoming, we use two-way clustering that controls for the possibility that the 
observation for firm i in year t can be correlated with another observation for the same firm in year 
t+1 and with an observation for firm j in year t. The method involves calculating cluster-robust 
standard errors along 2 clusters in accordance with the following expression: 
 
Vˆ(βˆ)= (X’X)-1 βˆ(X’X)-1 , where βˆ = ∑           
 
    
 
Here Xh is the Nh×K matrix of regressors; uh is the Nh-vector of residuals for cluster h. The one-way 
cluster-robust regression estimates unbiased standard errors if the errors are correlated within 
clusters, but uncorrelated across clusters. Two-way cluster-robust regression, however, evaluates 
the expression above twice: First it calculates one-way cluster-robust standard errors for each 
cluster – say V1 for year and V2 for firm. Then it calculates a cluster-robust standard error using an 
intersection cluster – say V3 for observations within a firm/year. Finally, the two-way cluster-robust 
estimator V is calculated as V = V1 + V2 – V3.2  
 
Petersen (2007) and Gow et al (2010) provide simulation results that compare the two-way cluster-
robust estimations with results obtained from fixed- and random-effect effect panel-data estimators 
and the estimator proposed by Fama-Macbeth (1973). Their findings can be summarised as follows: 
 
Fixed-effect estimations with firm dummies:  
Standard errors are un-biased, but this is true only if the firm effect is fixed. If the firm-
effect declines (increases) over time, firm dummies do not capture fully the within-cluster 
dependence and OLS standard errors remain biased downward (upward).  
 
Random-effect estimations, using GLS:  
GLS estimates are more efficient than the OLS estimates - both with or without firm 
dummies. However, GLS standard errors are unbiased only when the firm effect is 
permanent. If the firm effect is temporary, GLS estimates are still more efficient than OLS 
estimates but the standard errors remain biased downwards. 
 
Fama-MacBeth procedure: 
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 We have used the Stata procedure produced by Mitchell Petersen to run two-way cluster-robust regressions 
with panel data. See:  http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/cluster2.ado . 
The standard errors produced by Fama-MacBeth are unbiased when there is only time effect. 
With time effect only, the slope coefficients across years are zero.  However, if there were 
both time and firm effects, Fama-MacBeth standard errors would be biased downwards. 
 
Two-way clustering: 
Clustering by two dimensions (say year and firm) produces less biased standard errors 
compared to any method of one-way clustering. However, two-way clustering does not 
eliminate the risk of biased estimates altogether. When the number of the clusters along one 
dimension (e.g., number of firms) is large but the number of clusters along the second 
dimension (e.g., number of years) is small, the method of two-way clustering produces 
similar results to one-way clustering based on the large number of clusters (e.g., firms). 
However, this is not true for results obtained from clustering along the less frequent cluster 
(e.g., time). In other words, two-way clustering produces at least similar or less-biased 
standard errors compared to one-way clustering under all conditions. 
 
Our estimation strategy is informed by these results, which indicate that the two-way cluster-robust 
method of Petersen (2007) is either superior to or at least as good as other methods. This method 
allows for taking account of both serial and cross-sectional dependence in the error terms.  
In its general form, the model we estimate can be stated as: 
 
                                     (2) 
 
Where: 
INVj is a 3x1 vector of innovation measures, consisting of: 
1. Log of R&D expenditures 
2. Log of R&D expenditures as proportion of total assets 
3. Log of net book-value of patents and brands as a proportion of R&D expenditures 
 
CGk is a 3x1 vector of corporate governance indicators, consisting of: 
1. Board independence – a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if "outside" 
directors of a board constitute a majority over "inside" and "related-outside" 
directors; and zero otherwise.  
2. Anti-takeover defences – a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has 
both a staggered board and business combination provision; and zero otherwise.  
3. Insider control – a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if majority of 
outstanding shares are held by top management and/or directors; and zero otherwise.  
CGk*HHI is a 3x1 vector of interaction terms between 3 CG indicators and the Herfindhal-
Hirschman index as the measure of market concentration. 
 
HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, based on firm shares of net sales 
within each industry defined by four-digit standard industry classification (SIC) codes.  
 
FCl = is a 5x1 vector of firm characteristics, consisting of: 
1. Size1 – log of number of employees 
2. Size2 – log of market capitalisation 
3. Leverage1 - total debt as a percentage of equity 
4. Leverage2 – total debt as percentage of capital 
5. Age – company age 
We estimate model (1) in two stages. In stage 1, we estimate only the partial effects of corporate 
governance and market concentration (model 2 below). In stage 2, we estimate the partial and 
combined effects of corporate governance and market concentration at the same time (model 3 
below). Stated formally, the models for estimation are as follows: 
 
               ∑   
 
                   ∑   
 
                    (3) 
And  
               ∑   
 
         ∑   
 
                             ∑   
 
         
                    (4) 
 
In both models, the variables are as defined above. Of the error terms,    and     represent industry-
specific fixed effects;     and     represent the residuals that have a mean zero but may be correlated 
over time or across firms within a given year. We estimate both models with two-way cluster-robust 
standard errors, which take account of within-firm correlation over time and between-firm 
correlation in the same year (Petersen, 2007; Gow et al, 2010). We also use the four-digit SIC codes 
as industry dummies to take account of the fixed industry effects. 
 
We have clustered the data along two dimensions: (i) firm and year clusters; and (ii) industry and 
year clusters. We have also checked the sensitivity of our estimates to: (i) different measures of 
innovation (natural log of R&D expenditures, R&D expenditures as percentage of total assets, and 
net-book value of patents and brands as proportion of R&D expenditures); (ii) different measures of 
firm size (number of employees and market capitalization); and (iii) different measures of leverage 
(total debt as percentage of equity and total debt as percentage of capital). Finally, we have used 
lagged values of the regressors in order to reduce the risk of reverse causality from innovation into 
corporate governance and market concentration. 
 
We estimate model 3 three times to establish the partial effects of corporate governance and market 
concentration on two input and one output measures of innovation. We repeat the same exercise for 
model 4, which enables us to estimate the partial effects and combined effects at the same time. 
Estimating model 4 will enable us to establish whether the partial effects remain significant in the 
presence of interaction terms and whether market concentration and corporate governance are 
complement or substitutes in their effects on innovation.  
 
The existence of complementarity or substitution effects depends on the sign and significance of the 
interaction terms’ coefficients. If the coefficients on the interaction terms are significant and of the 
same sign produced by the multiplication of the coefficients on corporate governance and market 
concentration individually, concentration and innovation interact as complements. Otherwise, they 
are substitutes. On the other hand, the magnitude of the interaction effects can be compared with the 
magnitude of the partial effects in order to establish whether corporate governance and market 
concentration combined have larger or smaller effects on innovation compared to the partial effects 
of corporate governance indicators only.  
 
4. Estimation results 
First, we have estimated model 3 with three different measures of innovation as dependent 
variables: (i) R&D expenditures; (ii) R&D expenditures relative to total assets; and (iii) net book-
value of patents and brands as a ratio of R&D expenditures. For three measures, the relationship 
between market concentration and innovation is non-linear. This can be seen in Figure 1 below. In 
the case of R&D expenditures in levels and relative to total assets (panels A and B), the relationship 
has a U-shape. At lower levels of concentration, R&D effort tends to decrease as concentration 
increases; but at higher levels of concentration, R&D effort tends to increase as concentration 
increases. In the case of innovation outcomes (i.e., net book-value of patents and brands), the 
relationship has an inverted-U shape. At lower levels of concentration, innovation output tends to 
decrease as concentration increases but it tends to decrease at higher levels of concentration. These 
findings are in contrast to Aghion et al (2005), who report an inverted-U shape between competition 
(as opposed to concentration) and number of patents. In what follows, we will test whether the non-
linear relationship between concentration and innovation measures is statistically significant and 
whether it remains robust to inclusion of corporate governance indicators and other firm 
characteristics. 
 
Figure 1: Quadratic relationship between market concentration and innovation 
A- Market concentration and log of R&D expenditures 
 
B- Market concentration and log R&D expenditures relative to total assets  
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Panel A of Table 2 below presents the estimation results based on firm and year clusters, with firm 
age, number of employees and total-debt-to-equity as firm characteristics (control variables). Panel 
B presents the results with firm/year clusters as panel A, but with market value and total-debt-to-
capital as alternative control variables. Results reported in Table 2 remain robust to change in 
control variables and can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Board independence has a positive effect on R&D expenditures and R&D expenditures as a 
ratio of total assets, but the effect is negative with respect to the net book-value of brands 
and patents as a ratio of R&D expenditures. However, the effect is statistically insignificant 
across model specifications. 
 
2. The effect of anti-takeover defences (staggered boards and business combination 
provisions) is positive but statistically insignificant with respect to net book-value of brands 
and patents. However, firms with staggered boards and business combination provisions 
tend to spend less on R&D in level terms and relative to total assets; and the negative effect 
is statistically significant. Given that the anti-takeover defences is a dummy variable, this 
finding indicates that staggered board and business combination provisions cause the U-
shape curve in Figure 1 to shift downward by 0.474 - 0.493 logarithmic units in the case of 
R&D expenditures and by 0.198 - 0.215 logarithmic units in the case of R&D expenditures 
relative to total assets. In the case of net book-value of patents and brands, anti-takeover 
defences causes the inverted-U curve to ship upward but this shift is not statistically 
significant. 
 
3. The negative effect of anti-takeover defences on R&D expenditures is in line with the 
theoretical prediction of the ‘quite life’ approach in managerial economics and corporate 
finance which dates back to Hicks (1935). In this approach, anti-takeover defences (either 
through legislation or thorough firm-specific measures such as staggered boards, business 
combination procedures or poison pill provisions) hinder the market for corporate control 
and encourage managerial slack. As managers opt for ‘quite life’, they are less likely to 
commit to investment in costly innovative projects with uncertain outcomes (Jensen, 1988). 
A similar finding has been reported by Atanassov (2012), who demonstrates that state-level 
antitakeover laws in the US has led to decline in innovation by firms incorporated in states 
that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not.  
  
Table 2: Partial effects of corporate governance and market concentration on innovation 
Panel A: Firm/year clusters, number of employees, and total-debt-to-equity 
Dependent variable  Ln(R&D Exp.) 
Ln(R&D Exp. as ratio 
of Total Assets) 
Ln(Brands and 
Patents as ratio of 
R&D Exp.) 
Board_Indep_1 0.271 0.140 -0.187 
 
(0.172) (0.130) (0.439) 
Antitakeover_Def_1 -0.493*** -0.215** 0.166 
 
(0.114) (0.101) (0.169) 
Insider_Control_1 -0.485** -0.179 0.720** 
 
(0.226) (0.214) (0.309) 
HHI_1 -4.348*** -3.113*** 6.680*** 
 
(0.693) (0.584) 1.256 
HHISQ_1 3.141*** 2.136*** -4.881*** 
 
(0.696) (0.603) (1.297) 
Ln(Employees)_1 0.677*** -0.222*** 0.102 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.066) 
Total_Debt_to_Equity_1 -0.00000417*** -0.0000042*** 0.0000122*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Age_1 -0.002 -0.0027125*** 0.00577** 
 








        
R-Squared 0.429 0.227 0.121 
Number of Observations 2365 2360 1311 
Number of Firms 950 945 568 
 
Panel B: Firm/year clusters, market value, and total-debt-to-capital 
 Dependent variable Ln(R&D Exp.) 
Ln(R&D Exp. as 
ratio of Total Assets) 
Ln(Brands and 
Patents as ratio of 
R&D Exp.) 
Board_Indep_1 0.278 0.147 -0.230 
 
(0.178) (0.128) (0.444) 
Antitakeover_Def_1 -0.474*** -0.198** 0.162 
 
(0.113) (0.101) (0.172) 
Insider_Control_1 -0.515** -0.170 0.697** 
 
(0.236) (0.216) (0.314) 
HHI_1 -4.442*** -3.214*** 6.541*** 
 
(0.691) (0.599) 1.256 
HHISQ_1 3.209*** 2.201*** -4.763*** 
 
(0.703) (0.620) (1.300) 
Ln(Market_cap)_1 0.678*** -0.221*** 0.101 
 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.067) 
Total_Debt_to_Capital_1 0.000 0.0000135** -0.0000351** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age_1 -0.001 -0.0025309** 0.00562** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Constant -5.706*** -7.928*** -2.726*** 
   (0.750)  (0.262)  (0.742) 
R-Square 0.430 0.227 0.117 
Number of Observations 2347 2342 1302 
Number of Firms 945 940 567 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 4. Insider control (a majority of outstanding shares held by top management and/or directors) 
has a negative effect and the effect is statistically significant with respect to the level of 
R&D expenditures. Given that the insider control is a dummy variable, this finding indicates 
that insider control causes the U-shape curve in Figure 1 to shift downward by 0.485 - 0.515 
logarithmic units in the case of R&D expenditures. However, in the case of net book-value 
of brands and patents, the effect of insider control is positive and ranges between 0.69 – 
0.72. This indicates that insider control causes the inverted-U curve in Figure 1 to shift 
downward by 0.69 - 0.72 logarithmic units.  
 
5. The relationship between market concentration (HHI) and R&D expenditures is negative 
and non-linear (U-shaped), and remains significant across model specifications. A one-tenth 
increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 0 - 1 is associated with 31.1 to 44.4 per cent 
decrease in R&D expenditures at low levels of concentration, but the relationship changes 
sign at high levels of concentration. Furthermore, the relationship between market 
concentration and output measure of innovation (net book-value of patents and brands) has 
an inverted-U shape. Net book-value of brands and patents tend to increase at low levels of 
concentration but declines after a certain threshold of concentration. Our findings are in 
contrast to the results obtained by Aghion et al (2005), who report an inverted-U 
relationship between the level of competition (i.e., lower concentration) and innovation – 
which is measured as citations-weighted patents count for UK firms.  However, they are in 
line with Peroni and Gomes Ferreira (2012) who report a U-shaped relationship between 
competition and innovation in firm-level data in Luxemburg. 
 
6. Of firm characteristics, size in terms of the number of employees and market capitalization 
has a significant and positive effect on R&D expenditures. A one-percent increase in 
number of employees or market capitalization is associated with an increase of about 0.67% 
in R&D expenditures. However, the effect is negative and equal to about 0.22% when R&D 
expenditures are scaled by total assets. Both measures of size are insignificant with respect 
to net book-values of brands and patents. Both company age and leverage tend to have a 
negative effect on input as well as output measures of innovation – with the exception of one 
positive relationship between total debt relative to capital and R&D expenditures as a ratio 
of total assets.  
 
We have re-estimated model (3) by clustering the observations within industries and years. Table 3 
below reports the results obtained with number of employees and total debt relative to equity.
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Estimated coefficients remain the same – as expected. The only change concerns the cluster-robust 
standard errors. The positive (+) and negative (-) markers next to each standard error indicates 
whether the industry/year clustering has led to larger or smaller standard errors. It can be seen that 
clustering by industry and year has led to larger standard errors for 13 parameters and smaller 
standard errors for 5 parameters. The change in standard errors, however, has not led to any change 
in the statistical significance of the parameters. Therefore, we can conclude that the results derived 
from Table 2 remains robust to different levels of clustering.  
Table 3: Results of estimation with industry and year clusters 
(Using number of employees and total-debt-to-equity as control variables) 
 
Dependent variable  Ln(R&D Exp.) 
Ln(R&D Exp. 
as ratio of 
Total Assets) 
Ln(Brands and Patents 
as ratio of R&D Exp.) 
Board_Indep_1 0.271* 0.140 -0.187 
 
(0.157)(-) (0.128)(-) (0.428)(-) 
Antitakeover_Def_1 -0.492*** -0.215** 0.166 
 
(0.117)(+) (0.105)(+) (0.178)(+) 
Insider_Control_1 -0.485*** -0.179 0.719** 
 
(0.166)(-) (0.197)(-) (0.319)(+) 
HHI_1 -4.348*** -3.113*** 6.680*** 
 
(1.471)(+) (1.091)(+) (1.858)(+) 
HHISQ_1 3.141** 2.136** -4.882*** 
 
(1.245)(+) (0.964)(+) (1.696)(+) 
Ln(Employees)_1 0.677*** -0.222*** 0.102 
 
(0.038)(+) (0.033)(+) (0.070)(+) 
Total_Debt_to_Equity_1 -0.00000417*** -0.0000042*** 0.0000122*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age_1 -0.002 -0.0027125*** 0.0057654* 
 









      
R-Squared 0.429 0.227 0.121 
Number of Obervations 2365 2360 1311 
Number of Industires 215 215 177 
    *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
(-) indicates that the standard error is smaller and (+) indicates that standard error is greater than firm-year clustering 
 
Comparing the results in Tables 2 and 3, we can derive the following conclusions: 
1. There is 100% sign consistency between the results based on firm-year and industry-year 
clusters.  
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 We have also estimated model 3 with market capitalization as a measure of size and total debt relative to 
capital as a measure of leverage. The results remain similar. We do not report these results here, but they are available 
upon request. 
2. In majority of the cases, the cluster-robust standard errors associated with estimates from 
industry-year clusters (in Table 3) are larger than the cluster-robust standard errors obtained 
by clustering along the firm-year dimensions. 
 
3. The findings in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that our estimates for the relationship between 
market concentration, corporate governance and innovation are robust to change in control 
variables and to different levels of clustering.  
 
4. The results so far can be summarised as follows:  
 
i. Board independence tend to be positively related to innovation inputs but it is 
insignificant with the exception of one estimation based on industry-year cluster;  
ii. Firms with anti-takeover defences tend to spend less on R&D in level terms and relative 
to total assets at each level of market concentration. However, the relationship between 
anti-takeover defences and output measure of innovation (net book-value of patents and 
brands) is insignificant. 
iii. Firms controlled by insiders tend to spend less on R&D in level terms at each level of 
concentration, but  are able to generate more valuable brands and patents compared to 
firms owned by external shareholders.  
iv. the relationship between market concentration and innovation has a U-shape in the case 
of R&D expenditures in levels or relative to total assets; and (v) the relationship between 
market concentration and innovation has an inverted-U shape in the case of innovation 
output measured as net book-value of patents and brands.   
 
The results summarised above are estimates for partial effects of corporate governance indicators 
and market concentration. Such partial-effect estimation is the usual practice in the literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance, market structure and innovation. However, they may be 
biased upward or downward if there is interaction between corporate governance and market 
concentration. In addition, given that both market concentration and corporate governance rules 
shape the incentives faced by managers, it is necessary to estimate how both sets of factors interact 
in their effects on incentives for investment in R&D and on the ability of the firms to convert R&D 
investment into valuable patents and brands. In what follows, we address these issues by 
incorporating interaction terms and estimating model (4), which enable us to establish whether: (i) 
the partial effects of corporate governance and market concentration on innovation remains robust 
to inclusion of interaction terms; and (ii) corporate governance and market concentration are 
substitutes or complements in their effects on innovation.  
 
Recall that the corporate governance indicators are all dummy variables. Hence the interaction 
terms are zero when the firm does not have the relevant corporate governance feature and they are 
equal to the Herfindhal-Hirschman index when the firm possesses the relevant corporate 
governance feature in a given year. As such, the interaction terms enable us to determine 
substitution/complementarity between corporate governance and market concentration and to 
establish whether the firms with a given corporate governance characteristic are located on the 
upward- or downward-sloping segments of the U-shape or inverted-U shape curves in Figure 1 
above. As indicated above, corporate governance and market concentration will be complements if 
the sign of the parameter on the interaction term is the same as the sign of the multiplied partial-
effect parameters on corporate governance indicators and market concentration. Otherwise, 
corporate governance and market concentration will be substitutes. The results of estimating model 
(4) are presented in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Partial and combined effects of corporate governance on innovation  
 
Dependent variable   Ln(R&D Exp.) 
Ln(R&D Exp. as ratio of 
Total Assets) 
Ln(Brands and Patents 
as ratio of R&D Exp.) 
Board_Indep_1 0.052 -0.046 0.197 
 
(0.225) (0.175) (0.453) 
Antitakeover_Def_1 -0.957*** -0.615** 0.714** 
 
(0.254) (0.239) (0.348) 
Insider_Control_1 -0.076 0.184 0.396 
 
(0.339) (0.342) (0.712) 
Board_Indep_1 * HHI_1 1.140** 0.745 -2.122*** 
 (0.473) (0.461) (0.770) 
Antitakeover_Def_1 * HHI_1 1.005** 0.884** -1.508** 
 (0.457) (0.405) (0.732) 
Insider_Control_1 * HHI_1 -0.940 -0.838 0.459 
 (0.699) (0.544) (1.261) 
HHI_1 -5.219*** -3.434*** 7.922*** 
 
(1.516) (1.271) (2.370) 
HHISQ_1 2.706* 1.689 -3.894** 
 
(1.379) (1.078) (1.911) 
Ln(Employees)_1 0.716*** -0.212*** 0.128* 
 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.067) 
Total_Debt_to_Equity_1 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age_1 -0.003 -0.003 0.007** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 6.086*** -7.583*** -4.355*** 
 
(0.357) (0.224) (0.855) 
    
R-Square 43% 20.8% 12.4% 
Number of Obervations 2365 2360 1311 
Number of Industires 215 215 177 
 *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 The results in Table 4 indicate that only the partial effect of anti-takeover defences on R&D 
expenditures and net book-value of patents and brands remains significant. Neither board 
independence nor insider control are significant on their own. In the extended model (model 4), the 
sign and significance of anti-takeover defences remains the same as the base model (model 3). 
However, the magnitudes of the parameters for anti-takeover defences in model (4) are larger than 
the parameters estimated for model (3), which does not include interaction terms. This finding 
indicates that partial-effect parameters estimated without including interaction terms in model (3) 
may be underestimating the effects of anti-takeover defences on innovation.  
The second conclusion that can be derived from Table 4 is that the sign of the market concentration 
variable remains consistent with model (3), but the magnitude is larger in model (4). This result also 
indicates that failure to take account of interaction between corporate governance and market 
concentration may be leading to downward bias in the estimates of the partial effect from market 
concentration to innovation.  
The third finding in Table 4 is that the sign of the coefficients on the interaction term is positive in 
the case of R&D expenditures (in levels and relative to total assets), but negative in the case of net 
book-value of patents and brands. The positive sign in the former is consistent with the 
multiplication of the partial-effect parameters on corporate governance and concentration, which are 
both negative. This sign inconsistency indicates that the innovation effects of corporate governance 
are reversed when the latter is interacted with market concentration. According to the results in 
Table 4, firms with an independent board would invest more in R&D expenditures as market 
concentration increases. This is in contrast to the partial-effect parameters in Tables 2 and 3, which 
were statistically insignificant. Similarly, firms with anti-takeover defences would spend more on 
R&D as market concentration increases. This is in contrast to the partial-effect parameters for anti-
takeover defences in Tables 2 and 3, which was consistently negative and significant. A similar sign 
consistency is observed with respect to partial and combined effects of anti-takeover defences on 
net book-value of patents and brands: firms with anti-takeover defences are less able to generate 
patent and brand value per unit of R&D expenditures as concentration increases. This sign 
consistency indicates that anti-takeover defences and market concentration are complements in their 
effects on innovation. A similar but partial conclusion can be derived with respect to board 
independence. Overall, we can sate that interaction between market concentration and corporate 
governance leads firms to be located at the upward-sloping segment of the U-shape curve between 
market concentration and R&D expenditures; and at the downward-sloping segment of the inverted-
U shape curve between market concentration and net book-value of patents and brands as outcome 
measures of innovation.  
 Finally, we can also observe that the magnitudes of the market concentration (HHI) parameters in 
Table 4 are larger than the magnitudes of the market concentration parameters in Tables 2 and 3. 
This is the case for the three variants of the dependent variable – i.e, for R&D expenditures in level, 
R&D expenditures relative to total assets, and the net book-value of patents and brands relative to 
R&D expenditures. The larger magnitude of the market concentration parameter in Table 4 
indicates that the U-shape and inverted-U shape relationship between market concentration and 
innovation becomes steeper when we estimate the partial and combined effects at the same time. 
This finding reinforces the finding reported in conclusion two above: exclusion of interaction terms 
may lead to downward bias in the estimates of the partial effects from both corporate governance 





We have provided evidence on the relationship between corporate governance, 
competition/concentration and innovation for 1,400 non-financial US-listed companies from 2004-
10. The sample constitutes an un-balanced panel due to missing values, but it remains the largest 
sample used so far in the empirical literature on corporate governance, market concentration and 
innovation.  
 
The evidence - which is robust to model specification, cross-sectional and serial correlation, and 
definition of innovation indicators - enable us to derive a number of conclusions: 
 
1. The partial effect of board independence on R&D expenditures is positive but insignificant. 
Its effect on net book-value of patents and brands is negative but insignificant. Hence, it is 
not possible to establish any relationship between board independence and innovation. 
2. The partial effect of anti-takeover defences on R&D expenditures is negative and significant 
in the majority of the results. The effect on net book-value of patents and brands, however, 
is positive and significant. Hence, we can conclude that anti-takeover defences tend to be 
associated with lower innovation effort – as measured by R&D expenditures. However, 
firms with anti-takeover defences are better able to generate valuable patents and brands per 
unit of R&D expenditures. 
3. The effect of insider control on R&D expenditures is negative and significant with respect to 
R&D expenditures only. The effect on net book-value of brands and patents is the opposite: 
firms under insider control tend to generate more valuable patents and brands compared to 
firms owned external shareholders.  
4. The relationship between market concentration and innovation is consistent across all model 
specifications and method of clustering. The relationship is of a U-shape in the case of R&D 
expenditures in levels or relative to total assets; but it has an inverted-U shape in the case of 
net book-value of patents and brands. Hence we can derive two conclusions with respect to 
innovation at two end of the market concentration spectrum: (i) firms in less concentrated 
markets tend to spend more on R&D as concentration increases, but they are less able to 
convert R&D expenditures into patents and brands with market value; (ii) firms in more 
concentrated markets tend to spend less on R&D as concentration increases, but they are 
better able to convert R&D expenditures into patents and brands with market value. 
5. We also derive two conclusions with respect to interaction between corporate governance 
and market concentration. First, inclusion of interaction terms in models to be estimated is 
likely to correct the downward bias in the partial-effect estimates for both corporate 
governance indicators and market concentration index. Secondly, there is evidence to 
suggest that corporate governance and market concentration are complements in their effects 
on input as well as output measures of innovation. 
 
The implications of these findings for the debate on market concentration, corporate governance 
and innovation can be stated as follows:  
 
(a) At low levels of market concentration (i.e., when firms are less likely to extract rents), further 
concentration reduces the R&D effort. However, when concentration is high (i.e., when firms 
are more likely to extract rents), further concentration tend to increase the R&D effort. The 
relationship between market concentration and innovation outcomes is the opposite: at low 
levels of concentration firms are better able to convert R&D expenditures into valuable patents 
and brands as concentration increases; but they are less able to do so when the initial level of 
concentration is already high.  These trends suggest that firms in highly concentrated markets 
are more likely to utilise excess profits for financing R&D investment and as such they are 
more likely to engage in risky innovation projects which may not always lead to successful 
outcomes. However, firms in less concentrated markets are less able to rely on excess profits as 
a source of finance for innovation. Hence, such firms are under stricter constraints and therefore 
they are more likely to invest in R&D projects that are more likely to generate valuable patents 
and brands.  
 
(b) There is partial evidence that firms with independent boards are more likely to invest in R&D at 
each level of market concentration and their levels of R&D expenditures continue to increase as 
market concentration increases. There is stronger evidence to suggest that firms with anti-take-
over defences (i.e., firms with staggered boards and business combination provisions) also 
spend more on R&D as concentration increases. These results are in contrast to the partial 
effects of anti-takeover defences and market concentration on R&D expenditures. Hence we can 
conclude that firms with independent boards and anti-takeover defences tend to be located at the 
upward-sloping segment of the U-shape relationship between concentration and R&D 
expenditures. However, these firms tend to be located at the downward-sloping segment of the 
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